Thinking false and slow: Implausible beliefs and the Cognitive Reflection Test.

Why do people believe implausible claims like conspiracy theories, pseudoscience, and fake news? Past studies using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) suggest that implausible beliefs may result from an unwillingness to effortfully process information (i.e., cognitive miserliness). Our analysis (N = 664) tests this account by comparing CRT performance (total score, number and proportion of incorrect intuitive responses, and completion time) for endorsers and non-endorsers of implausible claims. Our results show that endorsers performed worse than non-endorsers on the CRT, but they took significantly longer to answer the questions and did not make proportionally more intuitive mistakes. Endorsers therefore appear to process information effortfully but nonetheless score lower on the CRT. Poorer overall CRT performance may not necessarily indicate that those who endorse implausible beliefs have a more reflexive, intuitive, or non-analytical cognitive style than non-endorsers.

Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions.

The capacity to evaluate logical arguments intuitively is a fundamental assumption of recent dual-process theories. One observation supporting this effect is the standard conflict effect on incongruent arguments under belief instruction. Conflict arguments are evaluated less accurately than non-conflict arguments, arguably because logic is intuitive and automatic enough to interfere with belief judgments. However, recent studies have challenged this interpretation by finding the same conflict effects when a matching heuristic cues the same response as logic, even on arguments with no logically valid structures. In this study, we test the matching heuristic hypothesis across 4 experiments (total N = 409) by manipulating the arguments propositions so that matching cues a response that is either (1) aligned or (2) misaligned with logic, or (3) cues no response at all. Consistent with the predictions of the matching heuristic, standard, reversed, and no conflict effects were found in those conditions, respectively. These results indicate that intuitively correct inferences which are assumed as evidence of logical intuitions are actually driven by a matching heuristic that cues responses aligned with logic. Alleged intuitive logic effects are reversed when the matching heuristic cues an opposing logical response or disappears when there are no matching cues. Therefore, it appears as though the operation of a matching heuristic, rather than an intuitive access to logic, drives logical intuitions.

Differences in Art Appreciation in Autism: A Measure of Reduced Intuitive Processing.

Art appreciation reflects an initial emotional and intuitive response to artwork evaluation, although this intuitive evaluation can be attenuated by subsequent deliberation. The Dual Process Theory of Autism proposes that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have a greater propensity to deliberate and reduced intuition compared to matched controls. Evaluations of high- and low-quality artworks were undertaken by 107 individuals with a diagnosis of ASD and 145 controls. Controls consistently evaluated high-quality artworks to be much better quality than the low-quality artworks, reflecting intuitive processing. The ASD sample showed a reduced difference in evaluations between high- versus low-quality artwork, which reflects reduced intuitive processing and greater deliberative processing and is consistent with predictions by the Dual Process Theory of Autism.

Thinking, fast and slow on the autism spectrum.

LAY ABSTRACT: What is already known about the topicDaniel Kahneman wrote a highly influential book titled 'thinking, fast and slow'. He proposes that people usually think in a rapid, automatic, intuitive style. When people realise their intuitive thinking may be wrong, a slower, effortful, deliberative style of thinking takes over. It has recently been proposed that thinking in autistic individuals can be characterised as usually thinking in the deliberative style (rather than the intuitive style that non-autistic people usually think in).What this paper addsAs intuitive thinking is fast and deliberative thinking is slow, this research manipulated the time available to complete a series of reasoning questions. These questions have been developed to have intuitive answers (which are incorrect) and deliberative answers (which are correct). For the first time, a fast time manipulation (you must answer quickly) and slow (you must think about your answer before responding) was undertaken with autistic individuals. Autistic participants did produce more deliberative answers than the non-autistic participants. However, both groups produced comparably more intuitive answers and less deliberative answers in the fast condition. This shows that while autistic people tend not to use their intuition, autistic people can be encouraged to use their intuition.Implications for practice, research or policyUsing rapid intuition can be useful in fast-changing contexts, such as some social situations. Future research can explore how to support autistic individuals to use their intuition when the need arises. In addition, the propensity for deliberation resulting in unbiased, correct responses reflects a strengths-based account of autism. This requires more mental effort and is less susceptible to bias and errors. This is called 'Dual Process Theory'.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking.

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Choice experiment selection of tourism destinations in a dual process theory framework: The role of decision style and potential to promote deliberation.

Models of consumer choice that assume rational decision processes are too simplistic, as they ignore intuitive processes and combinations of intuition and rationality. In dual process theory, System 1 processes are intuitive, fast, require low cognitive effort, and involve autonomous systems, while System 2 processes are deliberative, slower, reflect greater cognitive effort, and involve controlled attention. The dual process framework facilitates understanding of decision processes that may be diverse and complex. Based on response time as an indicator of System 2 use, we fill gaps in the tourism and choice experiment literatures by i) assessing the dimensionality of a decision style scale and its role in predicting System 2 use and ii) assessing whether researcher interventions, such as instructions, can promote System 2 use. The study is based on survey-based choice experiment responses of 483 domestic and international visitors across two Norwegian nature-based tourism destination contexts. Each visitor completed four choice experiment tasks for a total of 1,932 choice occasions. Results indicated diversity in extent of System 2 use. The decision style scale was multidimensional with both the intuitive and rational subscales predicting response time. We encourage inclusion of decision style scales-and specifically multidimensional scales-in future tourism choice and choice experiment applications. Statistically significant coefficients for instructions and unhurriedness suggest potential for researchers to increase System 2 processing in survey tasks. We encourage future use of this intervention, especially when survey tasks are intended to replicate "real world" decisions that rely heavily on System 2 use.

Deciding to be authentic: Intuition is favored over deliberation when authenticity matters.

Deliberative analysis enables us to weigh features, simulate futures, and arrive at good, tractable decisions. So why do we so often eschew deliberation, and instead rely on more intuitive, gut responses? We propose that intuition might be prescribed for some decisions because people's folk theory of decision-making accords a special role to authenticity, which is associated with intuitive choice. Five pre-registered experiments find evidence in favor of this claim. In Experiment 1 (N = 654), we show that participants prescribe intuition and deliberation as a basis for decisions differentially across domains, and that these prescriptions predict reported choice. In Experiment 2 (N = 555), we find that choosing intuitively vs. deliberately leads to different inferences concerning the decision-maker's commitment and authenticity-with only inferences about the decision-maker's authenticity showing variation across domains that matches that observed for the prescription of intuition in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3 (N = 631), we replicate our prior results and rule out plausible confounds. Finally, in Experiment 4 (N = 177) and Experiment 5 (N = 526), we find that an experimental manipulation of the importance of authenticity affects the prescribed role for intuition as well as the endorsement of expert human or algorithmic advice. These effects hold beyond previously recognized influences on intuitive vs. deliberative choice, such as computational costs, presumed reliability, objectivity, complexity, and expertise.

Intuition, reflection, and prosociality: Evidence from a field experiment.

Are humans instinctively good or is it only our capacity for reflection that enables us to restrain our selfish traits and behave prosocially? Against the background of dual-process theory, the question of whether people tend to behave prosocially on intuitive grounds has been debated controversially for several years. Central to this debate is the so-called social heuristic hypothesis (SHH), which states that subjects orient their behavior more closely to their deeply ingrained norms and attitudes when the behavior comes about in an intuitive rather than reflective manner. In this paper, we apply the SHH to a novel setting and investigate whether its implications hold true in a non-reactive field experiment, in which subjects are unaware that they are part of a study. We test whether subjects report a misdirected email or try to use the opportunity to reap a monetary benefit. Since all subjects participated six months prior to the field experiment in a lab experiment, we have solid measures of the subjects' general tendency to behave intuitively and their prosocial attitudes. In addition, participants were asked in a follow-up survey to self-report their intuitiveness at the time of the decision. While we observe a significant and positive effect on prosocial behavior for self-reported intuitiveness (but not for general intuitiveness) in the bivariate analyses, this effect becomes insignificant when controlling for interaction effects with attitudes. In addition, for both forms of intuitiveness, we find a significant and positive interaction effect with subjects' prosocial attitudes on prosocial behavior. Hence, this study confirms previous findings from laboratory as well as online studies and provides external validity by demonstrating that the SHH applies in a real-life situation.

Is intuition allied with jumping to conclusions in decision-making? An intensive longitudinal study in patients with delusions and in non-clinical individuals.

Research suggests that a jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias, excessive intuition, and reduced analysis in information processing may favor suboptimal decision-making, both in non-clinical and mentally disordered individuals. The temporal relationship between processing modes and JTC bias, however, remains unexplored. Therefore, using an experience sampling methodology (ESM) approach, this study examines the temporal associations between intuitive/analytical information processing, JTC bias, and delusions in non-clinical individuals and patients with schizophrenia. Specifically, we examine whether a high use of intuitive and/or a low use of analytical processing predicts subsequent JTC bias and paranoid conviction. In a smartphone-based ESM study, participants will be prompted four times per day over three consecutive days to answer questionnaires designed to measure JTC bias, paranoid conviction, and preceding everyday-life intuition/analysis. Our hierarchical data will be analyzed using multilevel modelling for hypothesis testing. Results will further elucidate the role of aberrant human reasoning, particularly intuition, in (non-)clinical delusions and delusion-like experiences, and also inform general information processing models.

"There's something inside": Children's intuitions about animate agents.

From infancy, humans have the ability to distinguish animate agents from inert objects, and preschoolers map biological and mechanical insides to their appropriate kinds. However, less is known about how identifying something as an animate agent shapes specific inferences about its internal properties. Here, we test whether preschool children (N = 92; North American population) have specifically biological expectations about animate agents, or if they have more general expectations that animate agents should have an internal source of motion. We presented preschoolers with videos of two puppets: a "self-propelled" fur-covered puppet, and a fur-covered puppet that is seen to be moved by a human actor. In addition, we presented preschoolers with images of a familiar artifact (motorcycle) and familiar animal (sheep). For each item, we asked them to choose what they thought was inside each of these entities: nothing, biological insides, or mechanical insides. Preschoolers were less likely to say that a self-propelled fur-covered object was empty, compared to a fur-covered object that was moved by a human actor, which converges with past work with infants. However, preschoolers showed no specifically biological expectations about these objects, despite being able to accurately match biological insides to familiar animals and mechanical insides to familiar artifacts on the follow-up measure. These results suggest that preschoolers do not have specifically biological expectations about animate agents as a category, but rather general expectations that such agents should not be empty inside.

Neural and Linguistic Considerations for Assessing Moral Intuitions Using Text-Based Stimuli.

This review takes a focused look at neural and linguistic considerations for assessing moral intuitions using text-based stimuli. Relevant neural correlates of moral salience, emotional processing, moral emotions (shame and guilt), semantic processing, implicit stereotype activation (e.g., gender, age, and race stereotypes), and functional brain network development (the default mode network and salience network) are considered insofar as they relate to unique considerations for text-based instruments. What emerge are not only key considerations for researchers assessing moral intuitions using text-based stimuli but also considerations for the study of moral psychology more broadly, especially in developmental and educational contexts.

How a crisis mindset activates intuitive decision process: role of inattentional blindness.

The current research provides novel evidence on how intuitive decision process is activated under a crisis condition and demonstrates a substantial and robust relationship among crisis mindset, inattentional blindness, and intuitive decision. We activate and measure a crisis mindset instead of directly measuring a crisis situation because a crisis can affect people only if they perceive and interpret it as a crisis. In Experiment 1, we find that a crisis mindset leads to a higher level of inattentional blindness. In Experiment 2, we provide direct evidence that inattentional blindness creates a bridge between a crisis mindset and intuitive decision. In conclusion, we fill the research gap on how crisis links to intuitive decision by demonstrating the key role of inattentional blindness in activating intuitive decision under a crisis condition.

Understanding the "gut instinct" of expert coaches during talent identification.

Coaches are an integral part of talent identification in sport and are often used as the "gold standard" against which scientific methods of talent identification are compared. However, their decision-making during this process is not well understood. In this article, we use an ecological approach to explore talent identification in combat sports. We interviewed twenty-four expert, international-level coaches from the Olympic disciplines of boxing, judo, and taekwondo (age: 48.7 + 7.5 years; experience: 20.8 + 8.3 years). Findings indicated that when coaches identify talent they rely on "gut instinct": intuitive judgements made without conscious thought, used to direct attention to particular athletes or characteristics. Our analysis revealed four major contributors to coaches' intuition: experiential knowledge, temporal factors, seeing athletes in context, and what can be worked with. Our findings demonstrate that i) athlete selections may be influenced by the coaches' perceived ability to improve certain athletes (rather than solely on athlete ability); and ii) "instinctual" decisions are the result of years of experience, time spent with the athlete, and the context surrounding the decision. Based on these findings, we recommend that future research focuses on the duration and conditions that are required for coaches to confidently and reliably identify talented athletes.

Moral "foundations" as the product of motivated social cognition: Empathy and other psychological underpinnings of ideological divergence in "individualizing" and "binding" concerns.

According to moral foundations theory, there are five distinct sources of moral intuition on which political liberals and conservatives differ. The present research program seeks to contextualize this taxonomy within the broader research literature on political ideology as motivated social cognition, including the observation that conservative judgments often serve system-justifying functions. In two studies, a combination of regression and path modeling techniques were used to explore the motivational underpinnings of ideological differences in moral intuitions. Consistent with our integrative model, the "binding" foundations (in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity) were associated with epistemic and existential needs to reduce uncertainty and threat and system justification tendencies, whereas the so-called "individualizing" foundations (fairness and avoidance of harm) were generally unrelated to epistemic and existential motives and were instead linked to empathic motivation. Taken as a whole, these results are consistent with the position taken by Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith that moral "foundations" are themselves the product of motivated social cognition.

Implicit pattern learning predicts individual differences in belief in God in the United States and Afghanistan.

Most humans believe in a god, but many do not. Differences in belief have profound societal impacts. Anthropological accounts implicate bottom-up perceptual processes in shaping religious belief, suggesting that individual differences in these processes may help explain variation in belief. Here, in findings replicated across socio-religiously disparate samples studied in the U.S. and Afghanistan, implicit learning of patterns/order within visuospatial sequences (IL-pat) in a strongly bottom-up paradigm predict 1) stronger belief in an intervening/ordering god, and 2) increased strength-of-belief from childhood to adulthood, controlling for explicit learning and parental belief. Consistent with research implicating IL-pat as a basis of intuition, and intuition as a basis of belief, mediation models support a hypothesized effect pathway whereby IL-pat leads to intuitions of order which, in turn, lead to belief in ordering gods. The universality and variability of human IL-pat may thus contribute to the global presence and variability of religious belief.

Psychology and neuroscience applied to financial decision-making.

All financial bubbles eventually burst and cause financial crises. In 2008 the US housing bubble burst, causing the global economy to suffer for 4 years. While the 2008 crisis received considerable attention because of its global impact, in the 21st century alone, there have been more than 10 financial crises. While economic, political and legal analysis of the crises have dominated academia, this dissertation argues that an interdisciplinary approach to financial market analysis is required to better understand why they occur. This argument is based on the idea, that the choices of traders are at the core of this issue, and consequently an understanding of trader decision-making behavior was required. Economic models of decision-making are unable to explain this behavior, as they assume decision-making to be an entirely rational process. To address this limitation, findings in neuroscience, psychology and biology are considered. Using this approach, this chapter outlines the role of different neural mechanisms, gut-feelings and hormonal states, that facilitate irrational behavior and increase a trader's susceptibility to partake in bubble markets.

Shifting prosocial intuitions: neurocognitive evidence for a value-based account of group-based cooperation.

Cooperation is necessary for solving numerous social issues, including climate change, effective governance and economic stability. Value-based decision models contend that prosocial tendencies and social context shape people's preferences for cooperative or selfish behavior. Using functional neuroimaging and computational modeling, we tested these predictions by comparing activity in brain regions previously linked to valuation and executive function during decision-making-the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), respectively. Participants played Public Goods Games with students from fictitious universities, where social norms were selfish or cooperative. Prosocial participants showed greater vmPFC activity when cooperating and dlPFC-vmPFC connectivity when acting selfishly, whereas selfish participants displayed the opposite pattern. Norm-sensitive participants showed greater dlPFC-vmPFC connectivity when defying group norms. Modeling expectations of cooperation was associated with activity near the right temporoparietal junction. Consistent with value-based models, this suggests that prosocial tendencies and contextual norms flexibly determine whether people prefer cooperation or defection.

Role of surgeon intuition and computer-aided design in Fontan optimization: A computational fluid dynamics simulation study.

OBJECTIVE: Customized Fontan designs, generated by computer-aided design (CAD) and optimized by computational fluid dynamics simulations, can lead to novel, patient-specific Fontan conduits unconstrained by off-the-shelf grafts. The relative contributions of both surgical expertise and CAD to Fontan optimization have not been addressed. In this study, we assessed hemodynamic performance of Fontans designed by both surgeon's unconstrained modeling (SUM) and by CAD. METHODS: Ten cardiac magnetic resonance imaging datasets were used to create 3-dimensional (3D) models of Fontans. Baseline computational fluid dynamics simulations assessed Fontan indexed power loss (iPL), hepatic flow distribution, and percentage of conduit surface area with abnormally low wall shear stress for venous flow (<1 dyne/cm2). Fontans not meeting thresholds were redesigned using 2 methods: SUM (ie, original venous anatomy without the Fontan was 3D printed and sent to surgeon for Fontan redesign with clay modeling) and CAD (ie, the same 3D geometry was sent to engineers for iterative Fontan redesign guided by computational fluid dynamics). Both groups were blinded to each other's results. RESULTS: Eight Fontans were redesigned by SUM and CAD methods. Both SUM and CAD redesigns met iPL thresholds. SUM had lower iPL, whereas CAD demonstrated balanced hepatic flow distribution and lower wall shear stress percentage. Wall shear stress percentage shared an inverse relationship with iPL, preventing oversized Fontan designs. CONCLUSIONS: Customized Fontan conduits with low iPL can be created by either a surgeon or CAD. CAD can also improve hepatic flow distribution and prevent oversized Fontan designs. Future studies should investigate workflows that combine SUM and CAD to optimize Fontan conduits.

Is the true self truly moral? Identity intuitions across domains of sociomoral reasoning and age.

Adults intuit that positive moral characteristics (e.g., being caring, being honest) reflect a person's true self. The current work aimed to extend research on the true self phenomenon (a) by directly comparing how moral and nonmoral norms are implicated in intuitions about the true self and (b) by examining intuitions about the true self across various age groups (children, adolescents, and adults). Participants from three age groups were presented with scenarios describing people undergoing change and reported the impact of that change on identity. The nature of the change varied in the type of characteristic (moral belief, social-conventional belief, or personal preference), the direction (positive change or negative change), and the target (self or other). Children and adolescents, like adults, judged that changes to moral beliefs were more disruptive to identity continuity than changes to social-conventional beliefs or personal preferences. All three age groups shared the intuition that negative moral change was more disruptive to identity than positive moral change, which is consistent with an understanding of the central role that morally good characteristics play in perceptions of the true self. Although these results suggest continuity between late childhood and early adulthood in understanding of the true self, age-related differences did emerge with regard to the target of the change. Children and adolescents reported that moral changes in others were more disruptive to identity than moral changes in themselves, unlike adults, whose intuitions were perspective invariant.